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THE CRISIS OF THE 
CHILEAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSCh) IN 1979* 
Introduction 
After Chile's military coup of September 1973, the Partido Socialista 
de Chile (PSCh) almost disintegrated; and the disputes of the various 
underground centres that emerged after the coup did not help to restore 
the credibility of the party. By 1979, through a series of splits, expulsions, 
and disagreements between the organisation underground in Chile and 
the segment of the party in exile, the PSCh went through the most serious 
crisis of its history, which had already been dominated by many divisions 
and disagreements over its political strategy. 
From 1979 to the present, the existence of a variety of Socialist 
'parties', with only one having a solid underground apparatus in Chile — 
the PSCh led by Clodomiro Almeyda, former Foreign Secretary of 
Allende — prevented a more successful and effective unity of the Chilean 
left, and thus a more credible political alternative of power to the military 
regime of General Pinochet. 
This paper will focus on the process that took the PSCh to its deepest 
crisis, in 1979, attempting a reconstruction of the schisms and disputes in 
organisational as well as political terms and an explanation of the reasons 
behind them. Answers will also be sought to the following questions: 
what is there left of the traditional Socialist Party yet another federation 
of groups and ideological tendencies or a more homogeneous organis-
ation? Where should we place the origins of the political crisis of 1979? 
The conclusion that the PSCh suffered an irreversible process of atomis-
ation must be a tentative one. Yet it could be said that it would be very 
difficult to imagine a pre-coup style PSCh. 
*The author would like to thank Carlos Marino (pseudonym) and Luis Ortega for providing 
him with some useful internal documents of the PSCh. 
The PSCh in the period 1933-1973 
The PSCh was founded in April 1933 and was the result of the fusion of 
various political groups of Socialist inspiration, the most important of 
which were Nueva Accidn Publico, led by Eugenio Matte, Carlos Martinez 
and Marmaduke Grove; Accidn Revolucionaria Socialista led by Eugenio 
Gonzalez and Oscar Schnake; Orden Socialista led by Arturo Bianchi; 
Partido Socialista Marxista and Partido Socialista Unificado. 
Two main factors contributed to the emergence of the PSCh: on the 
one hand, the military coup of 4 June 1932, led by Marmaduke Grove, 
with the proclamation of a 'Socialist Republic' that, even if it lasted only 
twelve days, had important effects on Chilean politics. On the other, the 
Chilean Communist Party (PCCh),2 heavily dependent on the Soviet 
Union, implemented policies that isolated the party from the masses and 
at the same time was going through an internal crisis produced by the 
split within the Soviet leadership, namely the dispute between Stalin and 
the leadership of the October revolution.3 By 1937 a group that separated 
from the PCCh, the Izquierda Comunista, joined the PSCh.4 In short, the 
vacuum left by the sectarian policies of the PCCh — during the so-called 
'third period' — and the enthusiasm created by the 'Socialist Republic' 
contributed to the emergence of the PSCh. 
In the first Declaraciones de Principios the PSCh stated that it accepted 
Marxism as a method of interpretation of the constant social change, thus 
implying the rejection of Marxism as a political credo.5 But, as Drake has 
pointed out, the PSCh at its beginning was influenced by different ideo-
logical approaches: from European Marxism to populism, from Hay a de 
la Torre and his APRA to the writings of Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos 
Mariategui.6 The different ideological approaches influenced the PSCh 
at the early stage, but throughout its history the PSCh would be more 
subject to political fashions than any other Chilean political party. 
Indeed, it was to be influenced by Titoism, Maoism, Castroism. And 
after the coup d'etat of September 1973, because most of its leaders 
would be living in exile in Europe, part of it was to adopt an ideological 
approach very similar to Eurocommunism and Eurosocialism. This last 
influence played a considerable part in the split of 1979. 
The tendency to redefine its political strategy and ideological orien-
tation has been the result of the different ideological trends always 
present within the PSCh. And although this freedom of 'intellectual 
debate' among various ideological tendencies attracted many left-wingers 
who rejected the strict and pro-Soviet orientation of the PCCh, it also 
produced a continuous weakness in the political action of the PSCh. This 
practice of continuous redefinition of the political strategy within the 
PSCh may be shown to be one of the reasons for the separation of one 
group from the party. 
The variety of ideological tendencies within the PSCh is reflected in the 
different political alliances which the party joined or implemented. Three 
main periods can be traced in the history of the PSCh between 1933 and 
1973. First there was the PSCh participation in the Popular Front. This 
political alliance was initially suggested by the VII Congress of the Third 
International in 1935, which in view of the growing danger of fascism 
recognised the need for unity among all political and social forces in 
capitalist countries in order to prevent the authoritarian trend which 
threatened to spread beyond Italy and Germany.7 Within this strategy, 
the PSCh joined the Popular Front with the Radical and Communist 
Parties, and in 1938 a Radical President, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, was 
elected. 
Although with the Popular Front the PSCh became a major political 
force and in 1941 obtained 17.9% of the votes, in that year, because of its 
rivalry with the Communists, the PSCh retired from the government. The 
dispute concerned the PCCh's dependence on the Soviet Union and its 
pro-Soviet stand in World War II. When the PSCh's proposal that the 
PCCh be excluded from the Popular Front was rejected, the Socialists left 
the government. From 1941 until the early 1950s the relationship between 
Socialists and Communists was so tense that they reached a moment of 
armed confrontation.8 According to Drake, because of the growth of the 
PSCh in electoral terms, this period represented the 'institutionalisation 
of the PSCh'.9 
The second period in the history of the PSCh could be situated between 
1942 and 1956, when it joined the Frente de Action Popular (FRAP) 
with the Communist Party. In this period, after the Presidential defeat 
of the Party's candidate, Bernardo Ibanez managed to keep the name 
of PSCh, one reason why the majority group adopted the name of Partido 
Socialista Popular (PSP).10 
The period in which the Socialist Party was led by Raul Ampuero is 
one of the most controversial in its history. By 1952, the PSP formed an 
alliance with ex-dictator Carlos Ibanez del Campo, who ruled Chile 
between 1927 and 1931 with an authoritarian government. Once again, 
because of the division resulting from differences regarding the question 
of whether or not to support Ibanez, the PSP suffered another damaging 
split. A minority of the party led by Salvador Allende, who categorically 
refused to support Carlos Ibanez, joined the Frente del Pueblo alliance 
with the PCCh, by then underground because of the Ley Permanente en 
Defensa de la Democracia introduced in 1948 by the Radical President 
Gonzalez Videla. 
Drake suggests that the period 1941-1952 was one of decline for the 
PSCh; yet it was not surprising that a party uniting such different ideo-
logical tendencies would suffer from splits, and the adoption of different 
political strategies. This 'peculiarity' of the PSCh has to be taken into 
account if we are to understand the division that took place in 1979. 
In 1956, after the failure of the alliance with Ibanez — who persecuted 
the left and the labour movement, including the Socialists — with the 
formation of the Frente de Accidn Popular (FRAP), the PSCh started 
its alliance with the Communist Party, an alliance which originated the 
political process that was to take Salvador Allende to the presidency 
in 1970. At the same time, from 1956 to 1970, the PSCh underwent a 
process of radicalisation of its policies, and, after the presidential defeat 
of the FRAP candidate in 1958 and 1964, the Socialist Party reached what 
has been described as the most controversial congress of its history, that 
of Chilian in 1967. 
The Congress of Chilian, 1967 
The XXII General Congress of the PSCh in Chilian, 24-27 November 
1967, represented a complete turn in the political strategy of the Party, 
and what could be described as the third period in its history. In fact, in 
our analysis of the crisis of 1979 we will refer to the political resolutions 
of Chilian as the starting point, in historical terms, of the crisis itself. 
As we have seen, between 1933 and 1967 the PSCh expressed different 
political strategies, according to the leadership it enjoyed, and the last 
was always the result of much compromising between the various groups 
within the party. 
At the Congress of Chilian, the strategy of armed struggle was officially 
adopted: 
Revolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate. It stems from the armed 
and repressive character of the State. It represents the only road to economic 
and political power, and to its defence and consolidation. Only by destroying 
the bureaucratic and military apparatus of the bourgeois State is it possible to 
consolidate the Socialist revolution. The peaceful road does not itself lead to 
power. The Socialist Party considers it as a limited instrument of action, 
incorporated within the political process that will lead to armed struggle.12 
This stand opposed completely the PCCh strategy of the peaceful road in 
the struggle for Socialism, and if one considers that by 1967 it was 
in alliance with the PSCh, one can imagine the consequences of such a 
statement. In adopting the strategy of armed struggle the PSCh was 
greatly influenced by the Cuban revolution and the guerrilla movements 
which developed during the mid-1960s in Latin America. Moreover, 
the PSCh always supported Fidel Castro, and in fact it had better 
relations with Cuba than with the PCCh. However, later, with the 
progressive alignment of Cuba and the Soviet Union, friendly relations 
developed between Fidel Castro and the Communists of Chile. The 
failure of the FRAP alliance in the presidential elections of 1964,13 the 
new wave of revolutionary hopes created by the Cuban revolution, 
and the unsuccessful attempt of Ernesto Che Guevara, influenced the 
PSCh considerably, although the second failure of the FRAP in the 
presidential elections should be considered as a major reason for dis-
illusionment with the peaceful road. 
Another important stand taken at the Congress of Chilian was the 
rejection of any possible alliance with the centre-left, represented by the 
Radical Party. This issue was important because the Communist Party 
always insisted on the need to include the Radicals in the FRAP alliance 
as the only conditions for the success of the alliance of the left. In view of 
the 1970 presidential elections, the PSCh declared that 
The incorporation of the Radical Party into the political front directed by the 
FRAP...would weaken the left, and reduce the chances of provoking a revol-
utionary process that could lead to power.... These attempts to incorporate 
radicalism within the left represent an artificial guarantee for the survival of a 
party in decline, and do not express any socially or politically progressive 
force.14 
This position was particularly important because of a by-election for 
the Senate in the provinces of Bio-Bio, Malleco and Cautin. The FRAP 
considered supporting the Radical candidate Alberto Baltra. The PSCh 
decided against this but, in spite of Party's directives, Salvador Allende, 
in a speech in the province of Cautin, declared his support for Baltra.15 
The agreements of Chilian, which set out the strategy of armed struggle 
and defined the PSCh as a Marxist-Leninist organisation, had unanimous 
support from within the party, although this was more a formal than a 
substantial unanimity. As stated by a Socialist leader at the time, the 
revolutionary verbalism of the resolutions of Chilian were followed by the 
election of a political leadership that expressed the more realistic sector 
of the Party, in fact the General Secretary elected, Aniceto Rodriguez, 
was well known for his moderate ideological convictions and was often 
referred to as a Social Democrat, within the complicated geography of 
the PSCh. 
The Congress of Chilian has an historical importance. First, there 
emerged a new generation of leaders, such as Carlos Altamirano, holding 
very radical views — he was to be elected General Secretary at the 
PSCh Congress of La Serena in 1971. They supported the guerrilla 
movement and argued very strongly against the moderate line of the 
Communist Party. Secondly, it was the beginning of alliances and agree-
ments between groups within the party, sometimes expressing opposing 
ideological tendencies, such as the alliance between Carlos Altamirano 
and Aniceto Rodriguez. Thirdly, the former General Secretary of the 
PSCh, Raul Ampuero, was definitely pushed out of the PSCh.1 Finally, 
there developed the dichotomy between official declarations and their 
actual implementation in political activity, with contradictions between 
the political strategy as expressed by one leader or the other. For ex-
ample, in spite of the official line of the PSCh — armed struggle — the 
alliance of the left in 1970, Popular Unity, included the Radical Party and 
other small groups which emerged in the late 1960s.18 This is even more 
surprising if we consider that, in June 1969, the PSCh launched the 
proposal of a Frente Revolucionario as an alternative to the PCCh Unidad 
Popular Democratica.19 The Frente was to include all the parties and 
revolutionary organisations on the basis of an anti-imperialist struggle, 
and on the agreement to replace the capitalist regime with a Socialist 
one.20 Yet at the beginning of 1970 Popular Unity was formed and the 
Radical Party was in it.21 
The victory of Salvador Allende in 1970, supported by Popular Unity, 
was to be a test for the whole strategy of the Socialist Party. The govern-
ment headed by Allende worked on a strategy of transition towards 
socialism along the peaceful road.22 It is relevant to consider this be-
cause from 1967 the PSCh was stating that only a strategy of armed 
struggle would result in the installation of a Socialist society. Thus, on 
the one hand the PSCh was actively taking part in a political alliance that 
intended to act within the parliamentary rule of a liberal-democratic 
society; on the other, it was stating the need for armed struggle. This 
dichotomy was always present during the 1970-1973 period and rep-
resented one of the reasons why, by 1972, there emerged within Popular 
Unity a duality of strategy that weakened the alliance of the left and 
represented one of the fundamental reasons for the defeat of September 
1973. 
During the Allende period, the Socialist Party supported a more rad-
ical strategy than that pursued by Allende and the Communist Party. 
While the latter worked within the framework of the Popular Unity pro-
gramme,23 i.e., nationalisation of the mines, land reform, redistribution 
of income, validity of parliamentary rules, necessity to carry out political 
reforms by peaceful means, the Socialist Party stated that only by de-
stroying the State apparatus and creating a new poder popular would it be 
possible to carry out the revolutionary process successfully. At one stage, 
by 1972 within Popular Unity, there was an almost vertical division in 
tactics and strategies that prevented a more incisive action by the govern-
ment. At the same time, not all the Socialist Party was committed to such 
a radical strategy. Within the Party there were sectors that supported the 
strategy advocated by Allende and the PCCh. Thus the PSCh stand was 
also weakened by its internal divisions; and this internal lack of hom-
ogeneity in ideological and strategic terms has prevented the party from 
being more successful in Chilean politics. 
By the time of the coup in September 1973, owing to its lack of a tight 
organisation and its divisions into factions and groups, the Socialist Party 
was almost destroyed. Only in late 1974 were there signs of some sort of 
reorganisation underground in Chile. 
If we wish to understand what followed after the coup within the PSCh 
we have to take into account three basic assumptions. First, as has been 
said, the PSCh has historically been a political organisation with a variety 
of ideological tendencies and expressed contradictory political strategies. 
Secondly, it was a party without a centralised party structure, resulting in 
differences in political actions as expressed by one leader or another. 
Thirdly, at the Congress of Chilian in 1967 the PSCh declared that only a 
strategy of armed struggle would successfully carry out the revolution in 
Chile while at the same time it declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party. 
To these peculiarities we should add the failure of 1973, with a party 
defeated in its political strategy as well as in organisational terms. These 
form the background to the crisis of 1979, with the consequent atomis-
ation of the PSCh. 
The Documento de Marzo, 1974 
After the defeat of the Popular Unity, in March 1974 the Central Com-
mittee of the PSCh — underground in Chile — launched a document 
analysing the reasons behind the fall of Allende and at the same time 
produced the most controversial debate that the PSCh has ever experi-
enced, which contributed decisively to the split of 1979. This document 
was a fierce attack upon the history of the PSCh, a violent criticism of the 
party organisation, style of work and programme; in short, a complete 
break with what the PSCh had been historically from the time of its 
foundation in 1933. Various leaders and militants of the PSCh took the 
view that the document was an attempt to liquidate the party, but in 
reality it was a criticism of the party and an attempt to re-establish it on 
the basis of a traditional pro-Communist type of organisation. At the 
same time, from March 1974 to April 1979 the group that supported 
the document gained control of the underground apparatus in Chile 
and a consistent percentage of militants in exile. The PSCh headed by 
Clodomiro Almeyda after 1979 was the expression, in political and organ-
isational terms, of the Documento de Marzo 1974.24 
All the parties in Popular Unity have elaborated various official docu-
ments to explain the defeat of Allende,25 and the document of the PSCh 
in 1974 is an attempt to give the party's views on the failure of the 'Chil-
ean Road to Socialism'. According to the PSCh, the defeat of September 
1973 was determined by the isolation of the working class and the absence 
of a 'real' leading force able to use — with possibilities of success — the 
revolutionary potential that was present within the masses and in the 
constitutional powers controlled by the government. The absence of those 
elements showed, according to the PSCh, the lack of a revolutionary 
strategy in the political process of the Allende period. According to the 
document there was not a clear political line, but only petty bourgeois 
influences, evolutionist tendencies, conciliation without principles, 
anarchist extremism. The possibility of compromises with other political 
forces was approached in a contradictory manner: on the one hand, the 
ultraleft tendencies rejected any compromise, qualified as conciliation, 
treason. And on the other, there was the tendency of superstructural 
political agreements, without the backing of correct mass politics.26 One 
of the themes present in the document was the criticism in relation to the 
lack of a 'proletarian line', a firm revolutionary vanguard;27 only a solid, 
homogeneous, revolutionary line could have turned the destiny of the 
Allende government and avoided the defeat of September 1973. The 
document is an attempt to justify the main conclusion of the text, by 
analysing the causes of the defeat of Popular Unity, as if the analysis were 
given a posteriori, in order to stress its conclusion: the re-establishment of 
the Socialist Party on a different basis, to the point of asserting that 'the 
party was — by and large — the main representative...of the political 
dispersion that prevented the consolidation of the hegemonic role of the 
working class in the leadership of the revolutionary process'.28 
After listing the various reasons for the coup (the lack of a revolution-
ary vanguard, the intervention of the U.S., the offensive of the right, 
the hostility of the Armed Forces), the document states that the Socialist 
Party must exercise a criticism of its principles and organisation, and this 
analysis must be massive, from the simply militant to the national leader-
ship, in order that self-criticism 'will help the party in the process of its 
reconstruction, proletarianising it in its ideology, political strategy, organ-
isation and in its concrete practice of the class struggle'.29 Various reasons 
are given in the document for the need to reconstruct the Socialist Party 
on a new basis. 1. The party emerged with a project of revolutionary 
changes of a very general kind, of a petty bourgeois character. 2. The 
definition of the party at the ideological level was not reflected in a 
'Leninist tactic', flexible and coherent. 3. Within the organisation con-
verged militants with a general approach to Marxism, different ideologi-
cal tendencies, and Marxism-Leninism had a very weak influence within 
the party. 4. In its organisational structure,30 the PSCh presented its 
ideological contradictions and the influence of the petty bourgeois revol-
utionaries. 5. The organisation of the Party did not develop from a 
Leninist point of view, although from the Congress of Chilian in 1967 the 
PSCh adopted the definition of a Marxist-Leninist party. 6, The party was 
disorganised, without any consistency, suffered a power struggle, and 
division into various ideological tendencies. In short, it was an insufficient 
instrument for revolutionary changes.31 
On the basis of the above criticism, the Documento de Marzo con-
cluded by suggesting the kind of party the political circumstances of Chile 
needed: an organisation based on Leninist democratic centralism, homo-
geneous in its ideology and programme, a party that must constitute 
the disciplined and homogeneous revolutionary vanguard of the masses, 
with very strict unity in its rank and file.32 There is no doubt that this 
document, in its substance and form, was a severe swing towards pro-
Communist lines, in terms of organisation and ideological conceptions. 
At the same time, it proposed a style of party that is not possible for the 
PSCh. Historically, the strength of the Socialist Party has been its ca-
pacity to attract to its ranks all non-Communist left-wingers, and so it is 
understandable why the pro-Altamirano sector of the PSCh rejected the 
Documento de Marzo. 
But questions arise from the document, namely, who inspired it, and 
more important, why create a party on those outlines when such a party 
already exists in Chile: the Communist Party. This question is of con-
siderable importance and raises doubts about the origin of the document. 
According to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, the Documento de Marzo, 1974, 
was the initiative of a pro-Communist faction within the Party, and what 
happened after 1979 demonstrated this, while the pro-Almeyda PSCh 
maintained that, being underground, and in the light of the defeat of 
September 1973, the PSCh must reconsider its history and become a 
homogeneous, disciplined party. 
1973-1979; the process of division of the PSCh 
At the beginning of April 1979, the clandestine Central Committee of 
the Socialist Party met in Chile at an unknown venue. The session was 
very important, mainly because of the Resoluciones Organicas, i.e., the 
dismissal of Carlos Altamirano as General Secretary of the party and 
the appointment of Clodomiro Almeyda as the new leader of the PSCh.33 
But this change in leadership was given publicity only at the end of 
April.34 Chilean politicians and political observers were taken by sur-
prise. However, Carlos Altamirano not only maintained that he did 
not recognise the resolution of the underground Central Committee, 
he actually stated that he was still in charge of the PSCh. Because of 
his refusal to accept his replacement he was expelled from the party. 
Altamirano stated that he had not been expelled, and 'according to the 
wish of the overwhelming majority of the militants I continue to be its 
General Secretary'.35 The change of General Secretary which, in normal 
circumstances, would have been the usual procedure, became a major 
issue under conditions of clandestinity, and with a considerable sector of 
the party in exile. To understand the emergence of various groups and 
'parties' which followed after April 1979, it is therefore necessary to try to 
reconstruct what happened within the PSCh from 1973 to 1979. This 
reconstruction is based on interviews and internal documents. 
Following the expulsion of Carlos Altamirano and his refusal to accept 
it, or, as the pro-Altamiranos say, following the take-over of the party by 
a group of Stalinists, there emerged two Socialist 'parties': one led by 
Clodomiro Almeyda and the other by Carlos Altamirano. Each launched 
a document to explain the crisis and seek the support of the militants, 
most of them in exile; the underground apparatus followed Clodomiro 
Almeyda. It has to be taken into account that during the first months 
of the military government the PSCh was severely damaged by the 
repression.36 Its lack of internal discipline, the ideological disputes that 
always dominated it and the massive repression had devastating effects 
for the PSCh. The militants remained isolated, no political directive was 
available, even the leaders were obliged to escape from the repression, 
and the disintegration of the party organisation was widespread. 
Within this context we should place the origins of the disputes over the 
legitimacy of one or other underground apparatus that emerged in Chile 
after the coup of September 1973. Now, the interesting aspect is that each 
group underground existed before, because both represented tendencies 
within the PSCh, and obviously, in the difficult circumstances of being 
underground, each claimed to be the Socialist Party. This is of consider-
able importance because, as stated above, the functioning of the PSCh 
took the pattern of a movement rather than of a disciplined party. It 
was thus natural that, once underground, each of these groups tried to 
take over the party organisation. Only the segment of the PSCh in exile 
presented a certain unity, not in terms of ideological homogeneity but 
apparently in terms of organisation. An exiled centre of the party was 
established in Berlin, but of which group existing in Chile before the coup 
did it recognise the 'legitimacy' and historic continuity? This question is 
at the root of the crisis of 1979. 
According to the pro-Almeyda PSCh,37 one of the problems which 
until 1976 the Direction Interna - the leadership underground in Chile -
had to face was the 'conflictive relationship' with the General Secretary, 
Carlos Altamirano, and a sector of the Secretariado Exterior — leadership 
in exile. At the origins of this 'conflicting relationship' was the fact that 
the Direction was not fully recognised as the legitimate underground 
PSCh, but the same status was given to another underground group, the 
Coordinadora National de Regionales, an 'anti-party' group that accord-
ing to the pro-Almeyda PSCh had existed before the coup, although it 
was apparent only after 1973. 
In the session of the Central Committee of the PSCh in 1975 in Cuba,38 
of the nine members of the Secretariado four were in favour of the 
Direction and four supported the Coordinadora, leaving the General 
Secretary, Carlos Altamirano, sometimes inclined to one underground 
group, sometimes to the other. It seems that financial help went to both 
underground organisations in Chile.39 
In September 1976, the underground PSCh held a session of the Cen-
tral Committee in which the political resolutions were in no disagreement 
with the views of Carlos Altamirano. At the same time, the Direction 
decided to ignore the other underground group, the Coordinadora, 
'because only a correct political strategy' would decide which of the two 
underground groups represented the continuity of the PSCh.40 
In the same month, Carlos Altamirano launched an appeal to the 
militants and urged them to recognise as the legitimate underground 
centre of the PSCh, only the Direction, which after the disappearance of 
Carlos Lorca and Ezequiel Ponce had new leaders.41 According to the 
pro-Almeyda PSCh, from then until 1978 there was a process of mutual 
trust between Carlos Altamirano and the Direction underground. 
The position of the pro-Altamirano PSCh is different, and even without 
mentioning the support for both, the Coordinadora and the Direction, it 
explains why it did not fully recognise the Direction as the legitimate 
PSCh underground in Chile until 1976. The core of their analysis is a 
rejection of the Documento de Marzo, 1974.42 According to the pro-
Altamirano PSCh, that document represented the initiative of an 'anti-
party' group, which took advantage of the difficult circumstances of being 
underground, with no direct communications with the militants, took the 
initiative of analysing the party structure and functioning under Allende, 
accusing the PSCh of being responsible for the coup d'etat. The docu-
ment, according to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, tried to change the ideo-
logical inspiration of the party and to reformulate it on the basis of a 
Stalinist swing.43 
To what extent the document of March was the reason why Carlos 
Altamirano did not support the Direction fully until 1976 and until then 
supported the Coordinadora as well, is a matter of discussion. We have 
to take into account that Altamirano was elected General Secretary of 
the PSCh on the basis of an alliance of various factions and ideological 
tendencies within the party. Thus the only possibility for his survival as 
leader of the PSCh was as the 'referee' of the various groups, a sort of 
primus inter pares. And we suspect that the reason for Altamirano's 
support of the two underground organisations was not so much the 
disagreement over the Documento de Marzo — which of course was 
strong — but, rather, his belief in the historical continuity of the PSCh as 
the expression of different ideological tendencies. It is clear therefore, that, 
from 1973 to 1976, while the sector of the Secretariado headed by 
Carlos Altamirano recognised both underground centres, Clodomiro 
Almeyda and others fully supported only the Direction, and this could 
explain why later Almeyda was put in charge of the party in bizarre cir-
cumstances. 
After the statement by Carlos Altamirano in 1976 urging the militants 
to recognise only the Direction as the legitimate representative of the 
PSCh underground in Chile, between August and November 1977, there 
took place a series of meetings between members of the Secretariado 
(Carlos Altamirano, Clodomiro Almeyda and Rolando Calder6n) and 
members of the Direction. The disagreements of the previous years were 
resolved, even if the Direction would not accept the reasons given by 
Carlos Altamirano on why he did not fully support them until 1976. 4 
Apparently, however, the problems were solved, and there was an agree-
ment on the need to stage a plenum of the Central Committee elected 
at the Congress of the Party in La Serena (1971), provided that the 
General Secretary would guarantee that the members of the Central 
Committee would support the Direction on the basis of a 51% majority. 
In March 1978 the assembly took place in Algeria, on those terms.45 All 
the participants of that event maintained that the session of the Central 
Committee in Algeria represented a historical act for the PSCh: all 
the resolutions were approved unanimously. There was unanimity on 
the political strategy and agreement to recognise the Direction as the 
legitimate underground PSCh in Chile. Carlos Altamirano was confirmed 
as General Secretary, although he insisted on leaving the post.46 New 
members within the Secretariado were elected and, most important, there 
was a statement that the PSCh had only one Direction, of which a sector 
was in Chile and another was in exile. 
What happened between March 1978 and April 1979 is as confused as 
the whole internal life of the PSCh before the coup. It is useful to analyse 
the versions by the two sectors, and then try to arrive at some con-
clusions. But it is clear that, apart from serious political differences, a 
strong personal struggle for the leadership took place as well; otherwise, 
how could it be explained that the unanimity of views expressed in the 
plenum of the Central Committee in Algeria in 1978 turned out to be a 
split over the 'historical project' of the Socialist Party in 1979? 
The pro-Almeyda version of the division 
After the session of the Central Committee of Algeria, the unity of 
the PSCh was 'evident'. Even more, in August 1978, a meeting of the 
Secretariado took place which, according to all participants, was a very 
useful meeting, and again there was unanimity of views. Yet, fifteen days 
later, Carlos Altamirano called another meeting of the Secretariado, 
claiming that there were 'serious problems' within the leadership in exile, 
that there existed 'minority and majority' within it, and that the majority 
developed a sectarian, Stalinist practice.47 Thus, Altamirano urged the 
Direction to intervene and solve the problems; in the meantime he would 
leave his role as General Secretary, without formally relinquishing the 
post. In yet another meeting of the Secretariado that lasted for days, 
there was no agreement at all, and the intervention of the Direction 
was urged. The document of the pro-Almeyda PSCh does not explain in 
detail the positions of the participants in those meetings, although by the 
accusations made by Altamirano it is clear that there were disagreements 
on political aspects as well as on method of work. According to the pro-
Almeyda PSCh, the Direction was surprised at what was going on within 
the Secretariado. Only in November 1978 the Direction sent a delegation 
to meet the leadership in exile. Carlos Altamirano renewed the accu-
sation of 'sectarianism and Stalinism' to the group led by Almeyda and 
declared that he wanted a majority within the leadership or he would 
resign as General Secretary and, according to the pro-Almeyda PSCh, 
concluded his intervention by saying: The Direction must consider 
everything I did for the party, it must analyse what the party is in exile', 
and added: 'with me, everything; without me, very difficult; against me, 
impossible'.48 
The representatives of the Direction tried to cool down the situation 
and, upon their return to Chile, the Comision Politica of the underground 
apparatus proposed a meeting of the Central Committee in order to seek 
a solution. They proposed that the General Secretary should be situated 
in Chile, a proposition that implied the replacement of Carlos Alta-
mirano. 
According to the pro-Almeyda document, during the organisation of 
the plenum of the Central Committee in Chile, 'something' started within 
the PSCh. Two militants of the party, who had worked for the Direction, 
went to Europe at the end of 1978 and met Carlos Altamirano. After 
returning to Chile they opened a campaign among the militants, stating 
that they had assumed, on behalf of the General Secretary, the organis-
ation of an anti-Direction group in Chile, and they urged the militants to 
call for a Congress of the Party. According to the pro-Almeyda PSCh, 
there is evidence of this.49 
The two militants working in Chile for Altamirano obtained the back-
ing of 38 militants and sent a document to him, criticising the Direction; 
the General Secretary made this document known to the militants in 
exile, and on the basis of this, declared the non-validity of the plenum in 
progress underground in Chile. 
One of the strangest aspects of this story is that, having decided to 
dismiss Altamirano as General Secretary, the plenum of the Central 
Committee in Chile did not place the new Secretary in Chile but ap-
pointed Clodomiro Almeyda, thus bringing about rumours that the real 
issue was power within the party, for in fact Almeyda lives in exile. So 
what happened to the proposal of the Central Committee to transfer the 
General Secretaryship to Chile? It is a mystery: in fact, no explanation 
has been given. 
On April 27, 1979, a delegation of the Direction travelled to Berlin, 
and in a joint meeting with the Secretariado, Clodomiro Almeyda was 
officially appointed General Secretary. Carlos Altamirano did not ac-
knowledge his replacement and was expelled from the PSCh, together 
with his minority within the Secretariado. 
The pro-Altamirano version of the division 
The document issued by the pro-Altamirano PSCh begins by stating that 
the origin of the crisis must be found in the Documento de Marzo, 1974, 
which, as we have already seen, criticised the party and expressed the 
need of a 'new' party, ideologically homogeneous, organised on the basis 
of a Marxist-Leninist structure. In March 1975, the militants and leaders 
who had taken part in the plenum of Cuba rejected the document, and 
'apparently' that statement was abandoned.51 But, according to the pro-
Altamirano PSCh, the group that inspired the Documento de Marzo 
continued to pursue their objective: to create a 'new type of party', with a 
rigid and dogmatic conception of democratic centralism, a conception 
that had strong Stalinist elements. The pro-Altamirano version also states 
that the plenum of Algeria was a good meeting, with a high degree of 
unity. All the members of the Direction elected at the Congress of 
La Serena in 1971 resigned, and one third of the members of the new 
Direction were from Chile (underground), but unknown even to some 
leaders of the PSCh in exile. At the same time, a majority of leaders that 
were in agreement with the Direction was elected to the Secretariado. 
But, most surprising of all, the plenum ended without a conclusive 
political document and, according to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, the 
process of take-over from the Stalinists in the party increased. As an 
example of this statement, the pro-Altamirano version asserts that the 
organisational structure of the party based in Berlin was composed of 50 
funcionarios, all of them in accordance with the Stalinist majority of the 
Secretariado. In order to achieve their complete dominance over the 
apparatus, the Stalinists urged 18 funcionarios to resign. According to the 
pro-Altamirano version, the process of take-over by the group headed by 
Clodomiro Almeyda was followed by a series of disputes, and the group 
headed by Altamirano accused the Almeyda of three main fallacies: 
1. they conceived the structure of the party in exile as an organisation 
merely supporting the Direction, but without a creative participation 
in the life of the party; 2. they used paternalistic and anti-democratic 
methods in electing the leaders of the various structures of the party in 
exile; 3. the relationship between the Direction and the Secretariado was 
maintained only by the group headed by Clodomiro Almeyda, excluding 
the General Secretary, Carlos Altamirano.52 
On 3 September, Carlos Altamirano sent a letter to the Direction 
suggesting that, in view of the 'style of working' of the majority group 
within the Secretariado, the whole of the leadership of the PSCh should 
be placed in Chile.53 In October 1978, the minority group sent another 
letter to the Direction about the disagreements within the leadership in 
exile. The majority group did the same, and the schism and non-working 
relationship within the Secretariado became obvious. The Direction was 
silent about the situation within the Secretariado, and only five months 
later did a delegation from Chile travel to Berlin to meet the leaders in 
exile. But, according to the pro-Altamirano PSCh, the reason for the 
delay was clear: the party underground started a campaign in Chile to 
remove Altamirano, and the Direction needed time to create a majority 
in order to bring about his replacement. In February 1979, 'a group of 
important leaders of the party in Chile' sent a letter to Carlos Altamirano 
stating that there was a crisis within the Direction and urging the General 
Secretary to call for a Congress; the letter also accused the Direction of 
being sectarian, Stalinist and isolated from the masses. 
With these claims and counter claims, another member of the Direc-
tion went to Berlin to meet with the Secretariado and announced the 
convocation of a plenary meeting of the underground Central Committee 
in Chile, declaring (according to the pro-Altamirano version) that the 
'comrades of the minority can take part if they wish to do so'.54 The 
minority group accepted the 'invitation' but stressed the need for time in 
order to arrange for a member of their group to travel to Chile. 
The plenum of the Central Committee took place without the partici-
pation of a representative of the minority group. The group declared the 
non-validity of that meeting and stressed that only a Congress could solve 
the problem. Carlos Altamirano was first replaced, then expelled, and 
then created another PSCh, or, as he would say, he continued to be the 
General Secretary of the PSCh. Two parties appeared, apart, of course, 
from other Socialist groups already existing. In addition, when the pro-
Altamirano PSCh celebrated its Congress (24th) in 1980, a further div-
ision took place in this party, thus confirming it as being formed on the 
basis of groups rather than on homogeneity of ideological approach. 
The crisis of the Socialist Party was, by 1979, at its peak. But is it 
possible that it was simply a crisis caused by a personal struggle for the 
leadership? To present it in this way is misleading. It is clear that the 
history of the PSCh is full of disputes over the political strategy of the 
party, and its functioning in organisational terms. However, the defeat 
of the Popular Unity in 1973, and the need of an analysis of what oc-
curred and of the extent to which the PSCh was responsible,55 plus the 
clandestine nature of the party in Chile and the difficulty of communi-
cation between the leaders and militants in exile and the underground 
apparatus, contributed to the crisis, of which the personal struggle is only 
the visible facade. 
The pro-Altamirano PSCh and the other Socialist groups 
While the PSCh headed by Clodomiro Almeyda presented (at least until 
early 1983) a united and homogeneous organisation as well as a political 
strategy — although recently there have been rumours among the left 
that this party is going through a crisis — the group that was headed by 
Carlos Altamirano until 1981 was, and still is, a federation of various 
ideological tendencies, but united in rejecting the Leninist party style, 
and in assuming that the traditional alliance of the PSCh and PCCh, 
which was the cornerstone of the political strategy of the Chilean left until 
1973, is not the right political alliance to offer a political alternative to 
the military regime in Chile. More important is its rejection of the model 
of Socialism established in Eastern Europe. Yet the lack of a solid under-
ground apparatus in Chile makes this a party in exile, although between 
1981 and 1982 there emerged some groups of militants supporting this 
sector. 
The novelty, particularly in exile, for the future strategy and alliance 
for a return to democracy in Chile is represented by the movement called 
Convergencia Socialista. The main political force behind this movement is 
the PSCh headed until 1981 by Altamirano. The proposition of Con-
vergencia was made in a seminar organised in Ariccia, Italy, by the Lelio 
Basso Foundation, under the impulse of former General Secretary of the 
PSCh Raul Ampuero. The crisis and division of the anti-fascist forces in 
Chile, the incapacity of the traditional political groups to offer a way out 
to the military regime, and the polarisation within the left of the various 
parties created the political climate for a debate envisaging a long-term 
battle, for a political project for a real democracy, open to a possible 
transition to Socialism.57 
The initiative came about just before the crisis of the PSCh, in March 
1979, and was a discussion of Chilean Socialism, its history and perspec-
tives, and had as a primary objective 'to unite in a seminar leaders of the 
various trends of Chilean Socialism, away from the Communist tendency 
and from others, such as the Social Democratic and the Social Christian 
sectors.58 The first seminar was followed by a second in January 1980. 
This is important, because the Socialist party was already divided. What 
started as a discussion became the platform for an alternative of all 
Socialist groups outside the Almeyda PSCh, as well as including other 
small parties of the Chilean left such as the MAPU, MAPU O.C., the 
Izquierda Cristiana and sectors of the Radical party. It was to be the 
starting point of a second alternative within the Chilean left. 
By the end of 1979 two distinct sectors could already be observed 
within the traditional left: the sector represented by the Communist 
party, the MIR, the PSCh headed by Clodomiro Almeyda, and some 
of the Radical party, working on a common platform, which by the 
end of 1980 became, particularly within the PCCh, a strategy of armed 
struggle.59 The other sector was represented by the small parties of the 
left, the pro-Altamirano PSCh and other Socialist groups such as that led 
by former General Secretary of the PSCh Aniceto Rodriguez. In reality, 
there was a vertical division of the Chilean left over strategy and pro-
gramme. All the forces of this second sector, severely repressed and dis-
persed and with a weak underground apparatus, had, as the only means 
of representing a substantial political force, the alternative of uniting. The 
Convergencia is the expression of this second sector which rejected the 
axis represented by PCCh-MIR and pro-Almeyda PSCh. The proposal of 
Convergencia is confusing, however, on account of the differences among 
groups, small parties and individuals that form part of it, from ex-pro-
Cubans (like Altamirano and other Socialist members), Socialists of 
Christian inspiration (Izquierda Cristiana, MAPU, MAPU O.C.), Social 
Democrats (like Aniceto Rodriguez), to ex-militants of the MIR (which 
were in favour of the guerrilla). How can these groups, parties and 
individuals work together and agree on a political strategy? This is one of 
the reasons for the crisis that the Convergencia is already experiencing. 
On the one hand, the sectors of the Socialist party outside the PSCh led 
by Clodomiro Almeyda are engaged in the process of reconstructing the 
'old' Socialist party and, on the other, they are engaged in promoting the 
Convergencia, which so far is not clear whether it is a union of parties, 
groups and individuals, or a movement formed outside party structures. 
In several interviews with Chileans taking part in the Convergencia, 
the definitions given are various. And the fact that there is no pro-
gramme but a series of proposals does not facilitate the task of making 
of the Convergencia a clear power alternative. Even the leadership of 
the Convergencia gives very different and confusing definitions. The 
Convergencia is presented as an autonomous political project at the 
international level and rooted within a new popular bloc. 
According to Alejandro Chelen, the Convergencia is a phase in the 
process of unity that by surpassing Popular Unity will lead the Chilean 
people towards the conquest of its historical objectives.61 Luis Jerez, one 
of the leaders of the pro-Altamirano PSCh, defines the Convergencia 
as the expression of the fact that the Chilean left lost its identity as a 
political subject, but at the same time needs to be reconstructed at a 
superior level. The Convergencia, he says, looks for a national political 
force able to capture the lead lost by the Chilean left and to offer a 
coherent alternative that will not disappear in doctrinary definitions, 
without sectarianism and pretensions of being the vanguard.62 Another 
view — and this contradicts the autonomy of the Convergencia at the 
international level — is that the Convergencia should join the Socialist 
International.63 The vice-General Secretary of the PSCh (pro-Alta-
mirano), Jorge Arrate, asserts that the Convergencia has three basic 
assumptions: i) the creation of convergencia at different levels of social 
and political activity, in Chile and in exile; ii) the promotion of discussion 
on central issues concerning the strategic perspective of the future; iii) the 
proposition of a common programme among parties, independents and 
groups, emerging from the deep crisis of the left and the failure of the 
traditional political project of the Chilean left.64 
Although the discussion and elaboration of the project of the Conver-
gencia is still in progress and interpretations of it differ and are often 
contradictory, it is a proposition that has matured, basically, among 
leaders in exile, within minority groups and parties, and, moreover, with 
no solid and consistent underground apparatus in Chile. In short, four 
basic issues unite the participants of the Convergencia: i) the recognition 
of the failure of the project of the Chilean left known as the 'Chilean 
Road to Socialism'; ii) the need to reformulate a strategy to Socialism 
away from that pursued by the PCCh, pro-Almeyda PSCh and MIR; 
iii) rejection of the model of Socialism established in Eastern Europe; 
iv) an attempt to unite the Chilean democratic forces in a strategy and 
programme that, while looking at Socialism, re-establishes certain values 
of a liberal-democratic society. 
There is no doubt that the proposition of Convergencia has been 
greatly influenced by the experience of its leaders in exile. For example, 
the suggestion of Eurocommunism is present in some writings and 
speeches of Socialist leaders. Certain approaches resemble the sort of 
strategy pursued by Felipe Gonzalez in Spain and Mitterrand in France. 
Themes of Antonio Gramsci are often used by the adherents of Conver-
gencia, such as national unity, relationship between parties and move-
ments and the concept of hegemony.65 But it seems that the Convergencia 
lacks support in Chile, where, in the last analysis, any power struggle 
will take place. On the other hand, the Communist party, the PSCh 
(Almeyda) and the MIR, although holding 'old' views, still command 
considerable support within the labour movement. Even the Christian 
Democratic party, which lost some traditional support because of the 
position it took in the early days of the military Junta, has regained 
considerable backing. And the anti-Pinochet demonstrations of May— 
September 1983 show that the CDP is the main force behind them, apart, 
of course, from the support the left has in the mining sectors and other 
trade unions. Thus, the project of Convergencia, even if it shows a desire 
for an alliance with the CDP, will face a political force which has con-
siderable support. But the traditional left has not lost its political appeal, 
and the Convergencia may find itself squeezed between these two political 
sectors. 
Conclusions (October, 1983) 
Since the coup d'etat of 1973 and the consequent repression of the Chil-
ean left, reorganisation of the structure of the various parties forming 
Popular Unity has been a very slow process. Even if some sort of under-
ground apparatus has been organised, up to the end of 1982 the left was 
not an effective opposition to the military regime. The repression of the 
first months of military rule almost destroyed the organisation of the 
parties forming Popular Unity, except perhaps the Communist party, 
which more successfully than others turned from legality to clandestinity. 
But in general terms the left has not been able to offer any consistent 
opposition to the coup. In addition, the deep division within the left 
prevented the organisation of an effective opposition. Only the Christian 
Democratic Party and the Church were able to 'participate' in politics, 
mainly because of their moderate opposition; however, since 1977 the 
CDP also has been repressed. Although the left has the solid support 
of the Coordinadora Nacional Sindical (CNS), which represents the 
united structure of the various local and regional unions,66 it is too 
early to assess the possibility of an alternative to the military regime. 
For example, the demonstrations which took place in 1983, although 
representing the first major confrontation between the opposition and the 
military, were met with strong repression. Certainly, the extent of the 
strikes indicates the general feeling of opposition to Pinochet, particularly 
when it is considered that even the right is opposing the President and 
demanding a change in Chile, by means mainly of a government of tran-
sition towards democracy. But the manner in which Pinochet is handling 
the popular protest indicates that he has no intention to go, unless a coup 
d'etat in the military dismisses him. 
It is within this context that the only viable strategy, according to the 
MIR, the PSCh led by Clodomiro Almeyda, and the Communist Party, 
is to work towards an armed insurrection, which implies a long-term 
solution rather than a short-term way out of the military regime. And 
on this issue the opposition is divided, a division which of course favours 
the military. There would be one group, the PCCh, MIR and PSCh 
(Almeyda), working on a more radical strategy and, in another group, 
other forces of the left, together with the CDP (Alianza Democratica), 
looking for a more moderate solution, a sort of government of transition 
towards democracy. In this last perspective the role of the CDP is crucial. 
After ten years of military rule in Chile, the opposition has not suc-
ceeded in uniting. On the contrary, there now exist two separate anti-
Pinochet alliances, the Alianza Democratica led by the CDP, and the 
Movimiento Democrdtico Popular led by the PCCh.67 This division does 
not facilitate a consistent political alternative, and certain crises within 
the parties have their origins in this political disorientation. This in-
capacity is reflected within Chilean Socialism, which is now vertically 
divided into strategies and organisations, although apparently there is 
some sort of agreement among the sectors outside the pro-Almeyda 
PSCh. When considering the crisis of the PSCh, we have to take into 
account the situation of the opposition in general, and if the crisis has 
been more evident in the PSCh this is because to the difficulties created 
by the military regime must be added the 'peculiarity' of this party, 
historically divided and formed as a confederation of groups and ideo-
logical tendencies. 
One of the questions posed at the beginning of this paper was: In 
which sector of the divided Socialist party can be found the continuity, 
in historical terms, of the pre-coup party? The question may seem irrel-
evant, but reflects important questions for the Chilean left. 
If the PSCh is seen as the party that from its foundation in 1933 un-
til 1973 was characterised by divisions, ideological differences and 
aggregations of various groups, then there is no doubt that the legitimate 
Socialist force that would represent a continuity would be the sector 
headed by Carlos Altamirano. In fact, what that group is again proposing 
is not a homogeneous party, but a federation of groups. And the Conver-
gencia is an attempt to unite all the small groups and parties that indepen-
dently could not be a relevant political force. 
Of course, the pro-Altamirano PSCh claims that it is in that group that 
the historical continuity is represented, particularly in ideological terms: 
autonomy from any international centre, a strong accent on the Latin 
American revolution, rejection of the Socialism established in Eastern 
Europe, the concept of the party as a body open to society and anti-
Stalinist; and, more importantly, the recognition that it is possible to have 
different ideological approaches within the party. It could be argued, 
however, that this was the kind of party organisation that caused the crisis 
of the PSCh. The lack of ideological coherence produced a dichotomy 
between party policies as expressed in its congresses and their actual 
implementation, as was the case of the Frente Revolucionario in 1969. If it 
is recognised that one of the major obstacles to a more effective Socialist 
party has been this lack of unity, then it is strange to propose again that 
style of party. But the question is more complex than that. We have to 
take into account that at the moment of the schism in 1979, the entire 
underground apparatus in Chile supported Clodomiro Almeyda, while in 
exile the forces were equal. Thus only a unity of the various Socialist 
groups outside the party headed by Almeyda could represent a political 
force. In short, although recognising the inadequacy of a party style 
such as existed before the coup, the Socialist 'dissidents' (as the PSCh 
of Almeyda say), or (as the pro-Altamirano supporters would say) the 
groups that represent the historical continuity of the PSCh, had no alter-
native but to attempt to unite and reconstruct the Socialist party. If they 
succeed — and to date there is little evidence of this — the PSCh would 
continue to resemble the pattern of a 'movement' rather than a party. 
How the PSCh of Clodomiro Almeyda might be representative of the 
continuity of the party that existed before the coup is a more complicated 
matter. Until the early 1960s the Socialist party expressed contradictory 
political strategies. The decade 1960-1970 was the turning point for the 
PSCh, and at the same time, the congress of Chilian was at the root of 
the problem. In that decade, particularly after the defeat of the FRAP 
alliance in 1964, the PSCh enthusiastically supported Fidel Castro and the 
guerrilla movements that emerged in Latin America. Disillusionment 
with the electoral strategy brought about a swing towards one of armed 
struggle. But, of course, in order to pursue that strategy it was necessary 
for the party to develop another kind of structure. It is in this context 
that it adopted the definition of a Marxist-Leninist party. The problem 
then was that the concept of a Leninist party and the strategy of armed 
struggle remained as declarations of principle, while the PSCh continued 
to be what it had been before: a federation of ideological tendencies and 
groups. The new strategy and party structure were not assimilated by the 
party as such, and that is why these policies were never implemented. 
For example, how could it be explained that, after the declaration of a 
policy of armed struggle, the leader elected was a moderate — Aniceto 
Rodriguez? Or that when the Frente Revolutionary was proposed in 
1969, the PSCh joined the Popular Unity alliance, which included the 
Radical party? The PSCh led by Clodomiro Almeyda claims to represent 
the historical continuity of the pre-coup PSCh. In a way, it is. It rep-
resents the continuity between the agreements of Chilian (armed struggle 
and Leninist organisation) with what they propose now. If one compares 
the agreements of Chilian with the Documento de Marzo, 1974, it is 
possible to discern the continuity in terms of the strategy and conception 
of the party's organisation. 
In sum, if one looks at the Socialist party as it has been historically — a 
federation of groups and ideological tendencies — the pro-Altamirano 
PSCh can be seen to be in line with the history of the PSCh. If one looks 
at the theoretical resolutions, particularly after the Congress of Chilian 
in 1967, there is no doubt that the party of Almeyda could claim to 
represent the historical continuity of the PSCh. Although in other circum-
stances in the past the various factions within the PSCh were absorbed, 
now it is very difficult to foresee the possibility of a reunion of the two 
main tendencies within Chilean Socialism, notwithstanding apparent 
efforts in this direction, and this will not facilitate the task of uniting the 
left in forming a political alternative to the regime of Augusto Pinochet. 
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